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Abstract
To control ever-increasing costs, global budget payment has gained attention but has unclear 
impacts on health care systems. We propose the CAP framework that helps navigate 3 domains of 
difficult design choices in global budget payment: Constraints in resources (capitation vs facility-
based budgeting; hard vs soft budget constraints), Agent-principal in resource allocation 
(individual vs group providers in resource allocation; single vs multiple pipes), and Price 
adjustment. We illustrate the framework with empirical examples and draw implications for policy 
makers.
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In the face of continually rising health expenditures, policy makers are confronted with a 
variety of cost-control strategies. Many have pursued innovations in provider payment 
methods and specifically, global budget payment. Notable examples include Blue Cross Blue 
Shield (BCBS) Massachusetts global payment-based “Alternative Quality Contract,”1–3 the 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) with Blue Shield,4 and efforts 
by the Maryland government to transform hospital care.5 Despite its potential, confusion 
about the impact of global budget payment is rampant.
Not all global budget payment systems are alike. Even the phrase “global budget payment” 
itself has meant different approaches in various contexts. The confusion presents a challenge 
in disentangling the empirical effects. While some studies found a negative effect of global 
budget payment on service utilization, other studies concluded the opposite and attributed 
the growth in service volume in a number of health systems (including in Germany, Taiwan, 
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and Canadian provinces of Alberta and Nova Scotia) to global budget payment.6 Policy 
makers need a framework to identify the key choices involved in designing global budget 
payment systems and how they would shape health system performance.
We conducted a systematic review of the literature on global budget payment and developed 
a conceptual framework to help guide policy makers. A search on PubMed and ProQuest 
database with the terms “global budget” or “global payment” or “global budget payment” on 
April 15, 2015, yielded 212 articles, of which 75 were excluded for irrelevance based on 
abstract screening. Of the 137 full-text articles reviewed, 68 qualitative writings and 23 
irrelevant studies were further excluded. In the end, 46 studies of empirical evaluation of 
global budget payment were included in informing the development of our conceptual 
framework.
From our review, three key domains of choices in designing global budget emerged as the 
critical factors that could significantly shape its performance—(1) constraints of resources, 
(2) agent-principal in resource allocation, and (3) price adjustment—abbreviated as “CAP” 
framework.
Constraints of Resources
The resource constraints of a global budget—both in terms of how the amount of resources 
is determined and how stringent the constraint is—greatly affect provider behavior. The 
global budget can be set by summing up the risk-adjusted health expenditures per capita 
(capitation-based), or from the supply side, by totaling the budgets for all provider 
organizations (facility-based). The latter, similar to traditional hospital budgeting, is 
administratively easier, but resource use across facilities is not necessarily aligned to 
population needs, for example, facilities are incentivized to overestimate budgets and spend 
all regardless of patient loads.7 In contrast, the money-follow-patient capitation-based 
budgeting is believed to enable quality improvement by allowing resource transfers across 
providers and facilitating integration of care.8,9 Many recent reforms post–Affordable Care 
Act, such as Maryland’s transition to hospital global budget, are based on such premise.5,10 
Once the budget is set, payers can decide between a “hard” cap where providers are not 
reimbursed at all for expenditures above the benchmark, and a “soft” target permitting 
partial reimbursement. Empirically, soft target often fails to contain actual health spending, 
unless the penalty for exceeding target is substantial.11 In Quebec, Canada, for example, 
when physician fees were reduced by 75% when the soft target was reached, physicians 
would simply cease service provision.12
Agent-Principal in Resource Allocation
Resource allocation involves a contract between the principal (the payers) and the agents 
(the providers). Whether the entities on either side of the negotiation choose to work 
independently as individuals or collectively as a group would dictate their bargaining power. 
Moreover, if budgets are allocated to individual providers, there is little financial uncertainty 
given the fixed revenues. Hence, without counteracting interventions, providers may focus 
on cost reduction, leading to compromised access or quality, as experienced by Canadian 
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and French hospitals.13–15 By contracting as a group, providers collectively preserve 
professional autonomy in resource use, but would need to define a mechanism to further 
distribute funds to individual providers, which determines the financial incentives and 
provider behavior. For instance, if the intragroup fund allocation is based on relative volume 
shares as seen in Taiwan and Germany, competition could significantly intensify.
Similarly, in a multipayer system, each payer may have the choice to conduct its respective 
activities separately (as in Germany and most US states), or alternatively, the payers may 
consolidate resources and unify rules of engagement with providers through, for instance, 
enforcing all-payer rates (as in Japan and Maryland).16,17 With more insured lives 
collectively, payers could reach more favorable rates with better bargaining power18 and, 
more importantly, could contain costs more effectively by minimizing providers shifting 
costs toward payer schemes where they are better reimbursed.19
Price Adjustment
In several systems, cost containment is achieved through adjusting prices in accordance with 
volume changes, rather than volume control. Typically, such expenditure cap is 
superimposed upon a fee-for-service-like scheme, where relative prices of health services 
remain the same but the actual values are determined ex post, depending on a price 
conversion factor to equate the monetary value of actual services delivered to the set budget. 
Consequently, such price adjustment generates “tragedy-of-the-commons” incentives. 
Specifically, as the provider reimbursement is determined retrospectively contingent on the 
relative volume shares, providers are incentivized to engage in volume expansion, which 
ironically reduces prices for all.20 Furthermore, it has been observed repeatedly that in 
addition to volume growth, there are also changes in service mix and practice with grave 
implications for allocative efficiency and health care quality.6,21
We mapped a number of well-known and empirically documented examples of global 
budget payment systems using our framework (see Table 1). There may be examples which 
have yet to be empirically evaluated. Given the potential choices across the three domains, 
there is a large spectrum of different combinations manifesting as a “global budget 
payment.” Evaluations and assessments of a singular “global budget system” without 
specifying the constitutive design features may lead to confusion and fail to clarify the trade-
offs associated with different policy levers. However confusing and complex global budget 
payment may be, it is clear that global budget payment is hardly a silver bullet. Moreover, to 
ensure that quality of care is not compromised by the bluntness of cost containment, 
concomitant incentives to reward providers to achieve certain quality benchmarks, as is the 
case in BCBS Massachusetts’ Alternative Quality Contract,1–3 are also highly advised.
Our literature review and our framework excluded studies that did not impose a strict budget 
cap. For example, the Medicare Shared Savings Program does not penalize providers for 
spendings in excess of the targets, though it rewards them if expenditures are below financial 
targets. Our review also distinguished global budgets from pure quality-based incentives. 
Recent global budget schemes are frequently complemented with quality incentives given 
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the concerns on quality impact and increasing focus on value of care,7 but the two are 
distinct and separate payment methods, with different incentive mechanisms.
Given how much we have yet to know about global budget payment, it is important that 
policy makers view it not as a single intervention but a set of policy design choices, and 
design new attempts of global budget payment in a way that is amenable to rigorous 
evaluations with a framework like the CAP framework proposed here. Only then could we 
tailor the global budget payment to the unique context and priorities of different health 
systems, and do so in an evidence- based manner.
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